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 ABSTRACT 
In the context of the ongoing reforms on European labour markets the keyword 
‘flexicurity’ is presently gaining prominence. We therefore want to explore the 
importance of the flexicurity-concept on the example of the German Hartz-
reforms. Starting from the frequently used definition as a trade-off between em-
ployers’ demands for flexibility and employees’ needs for security, different con-
ceptualisations of flexicurity are considered, and criteria for an efficient and 
equitable flexicurity-nexus are developed. The German debate on flexicurity is 
briefly looked at. The main part of the paper is devoted to analysing four policy 
measures which were implemented within the Hartz-reforms: ‘Ich-AG’ allowance 
for newly founded businesses, ‘personnel service agencies’ (‘PSA’) to place un-
employed into regular employment, ‘Mini-Jobs’ and the introduction of ‘Midi-Jobs’ 
which were supposed to serve as stepping stones into employment subject to 
social insurance contributions and ‘wage insurance’ for elderly workers. It is as-
sessed whether the measures contribute to enhancing the components of flexibil-
ity and security and whether the measures are appropriately balanced. The 
analysis reveals that the measures’ quality could be improved by strengthening 
different components of the security dimension. 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Das Schlagwort „Flexicurity“ gewinnt im Rahmen der aktuellen Reformen auf den 
europäischen Arbeitsmärkten an Bedeutung. Die Tragweite des Flexicurity-
Konzepts soll hier am Beispiel der Hartz-Reformen in Deutschland untersucht 
werden. Ausgehend von der Definition als Zielkonflikt zwischen dem Bedürfnis 
der Arbeitgeber nach Flexibilität und dem Bedürfnis der Arbeitnehmer nach Si-
cherheit werden weitere Konzeptualisierungen des Terms erörtert. Darauf auf-
bauend werden Kriterien für einen sowohl effizienten als auch gerechten 
Flexicurity-Nexus entwickelt. Nach einem kurzen Überblick über den Verlauf der 
Flexicurity-Debatte in Deutschland werden vier Instrumente, die im Rahmen der 
Hartz-Gesetzgebung eingeführt wurden, vorgestellt: Die „Ich-AG“-Unterstützung 
für den Übergang in die Selbständigkeit, die „Personal Service Agenturen“ (PSA) 
für die Vermittlung ehemals Arbeitsloser in reguläre Beschäftigungsverhältnisse, 
„Mini-Jobs“ und die Einführung von „Midi-Jobs“, intendiert als Brücke in sozial-
versicherungspflichtige Beschäftigung, sowie die „Entgeltsicherung für ältere Ar-
beitnehmer“. An Hand der im Theorieteil entwickelten Kriterien wird gefragt, 
inwieweit die einzelnen Komponenten von Flexibilität und Sicherheit gestärkt 
werden und inwieweit die Maßnahmen ausgewogen sind. Die Analyse zeigt da-
bei auf, dass die Qualität der Maßnahmen durch die Stärkung unterschiedlicher 
Komponenten der Sicherheitsdimension gesteigert werden könnte. 
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1. Introduction1 
‘There is no more paradox in this [in intellectual property protection – the 
authors] than there is in saying that motorcars are travelling faster than 
they otherwise would because they are provided with brakes.’  
(Schumpeter 1976: 88)  
The argument we would like to bring forward is captured in Schumpeter’s famous 
quotation, which can be reformulated in the following way: ‘There is no more 
paradox in ‘flexicurity’ than there is in saying that workers are more flexible and 
creative than they otherwise would because they are provided with securities.’ 
This paradoxical marriage of flexibility and security has been strongly promoted 
by the European Employment Taskforce headed by Wim Kok, which published its 
report ‘Jobs, Jobs, Jobs. Creating More Employment in Europe’ in November 
2003. The title of this report was contested – and in some countries even badly 
accepted – for many people in Germany, for example, the term ‘job’ carries the 
connotation of non-standard low quality employment. However, within the report, 
security is clearly regarded as a prerequisite for the acceptance of flexibility, al-
beit in a new sense.  
First, job security as a matter of preserving a job for life is abandoned. In return, 
employability, security, and decent pay as well as good working conditions are 
emphasised. Second, individualised assistance in finding a job and transferable 
social rights to foster mobility are brought up. Third, people should be encour-
aged to take risks (compare also Schmid 2006). Social security institutions, es-
pecially pension systems, should therefore be designed in such a way that they 
reward instead of punish people for taking up flexible jobs. Denmark and the 
Netherlands are reported as good practice cases. However, both countries follow 
quite different concepts of flexicurity: Denmark combines low employment protec-
tion with generous unemployment benefits, the Netherlands, on the other hand, 
combine high employment protection with high variability of employment con-
tracts. The message the Employment Taskforce wanted to bring forward was that 
the EU-Member States should be encouraged to develop their own strategy to 
reconcile flexibility and security.  
How has Germany responded to this challenge of finding its own ideal flexibility-
security nexus? This paper will try to answer this question in four steps: First, 
definitions and criteria for a successful ‘marriage’ between flexibility and security 
will be developed, followed, second, by a brief overview of the German debate on 
flexicurity. In the third and main section, we assess the experiences with some 
                                            
 1 We are grateful to Silke Gülker and Petra Kaps for comments on an earlier version. 
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specific German flexicurity measures introduced through the Hartz-reforms. We 
conclude by drawing some lessons from these experiences for the European 
Employment Strategy. 
2. Flexibility and security: definitions and criteria 
According to Tangian (2005) the flexibility-security nexus can be regarded from 
two different perspectives: First, as a trade-off to be optimized between social 
partners, and second as a kind of social insurance for the flexibly employed. 
Whereas the first perspective is predominant in the present debate, we will also 
strongly emphasise the second perspective.  
Wilthagen and Tros (2004) suggest analysing flexicurity policies as trade-offs. 
They propose a trade-off matrix that contrasts four forms of flexibility and four 
types of security. Flexibility that mainly caters to employers’ demands can take 
the form of external numerical, internal numerical, functional flexibility and vari-
able pay. Security, in this trade-off matrix, is subdivided into job security, em-
ployment security/employability security, income security and combination 
security. Whereas the first three types of security are to be expanded to satisfy 
the needs of labour market outsiders or atypically employed, combination security 
adds the possibility to combine paid work with private responsibilities (Wilthagen 
et al. 2003). 
For the sake of terminological consistency, we slightly modify this typology by 
subdividing ‘functional flexibility’ into ‘internal’ and ‘external functional flexibility’. 
On the pay level, internal functional flexibility is thought of as going hand in hand 
with result oriented or ‘variable pay’ whereas on the macro level external func-
tional flexibility is supposed to generally enhance wage flexibility. On the security 
side, we slightly change the terminology by coining ‘combination security’ as ‘op-
tion security’ in order to give this security aspect a broader meaning. 
From an employers’ point of view, four types of flexibility can therefore be distin-
guished:  
? External numerical flexibility to hire and fire, or to use temporary layoff, 
fixed-term contracts, temp-agency work, casual work or marginal em-
ployment (in Germany, recently coined ‘Mini-Jobs’ and ‘Midi-Jobs’)2 
? Internal numerical flexibility in the form of overtime or short-time work, 
part-time work, marginal employment or time banking (short- or long-term 
working time accounts) 
                                            
 2 Although in Germany employment protection also holds for marginal employed work-
ers, marginal employment is also often used to cope with work peaks. 
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? Internal functional flexibility as provided by multiple skills of the employ-
ees, flexible work organization, on-the-job learning and variable pay (for 
instance according to results or individual effort)  
? External functional flexibility achieved through off-the-job learning, out-
sourcing, wage flexibility, and also through high-quality temp-agency 
work. 
From the point of view of the employees, we distinguish four forms of security: 
? Job security as the certainty of retaining a specific job with a specific em-
ployer 
? Employment or employability security as the certainty of remaining in 
work, not necessarily with the same employer 
? Income security as income protection in case that paid work ceases, for 
instance, through dismissal or mass unemployment, or through chronic 
illness, disability or retirement 
? Option security as the certainty of having various employment options, for 
instance the possibility to combine paid work with unpaid work (for exam-
ple caring or civic engagement), the entitlement to continuous education 
or training, or the right for intermediate working time reduction. 
The nexus between these types of flexibility and security is more complicated 
than commonly thought (table 1). First, there is not only a trade-off between flexi-
bility and security. The flexibility gains of employers do not necessarily mean a 
loss of security among employees; similarly, security gains of employees do not 
necessarily have to go along with flexibility losses among employers. Therefore, 
the talk about a balance between flexibility and security – usually thought of as a 
compromise between employers and employees – does unduly simplify the 
nexus. 
As in marriage, it depends on how both partners act together. Apart from trade-
offs, the flexibility-security nexus can also reflect a mutual supportive or comple-
mentary relationship. Job security, for instance, can induce employees to be loyal 
to the employer and to invest in firm specific human capital, thereby increasing 
internal functional flexibility.  
The nexus, however, can also be deadly vicious, for instance when hire and fire 
policies lead to an overall insecurity, thereby lowering not only effective demand, 
but also fertility. While in the short run, the willingness to invest in human capital 
and, therefore, the availability of highly skilled workers would decline, in the long-
term the size of the whole workforce could decrease. 
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Table 1: The flexibility-security nexus: trade-off (t), complementary (c)  
or vicious relationship (v) 
 Security  
Flexibility 
Job 
Security 
Employment/ 
Employability 
Security 
Income  
Security 
Option  
Security 
External Numerical t t / c / v t / c / v t 
Internal Numerical c c (t) / c t / c 
Internal Functional c c t / c (t) / c 
External Functional c t / c / v t / c t / c 
The flexibility-security matrix – as it is presented here – is static. It does not re-
flect the possible interrelationships between the different types of flexibility and 
security. Here, the dynamic perspective of transitional labour markets (tlm)3 pro-
vides criteria whether flexible (or ‘non-standard’) forms of employment serve as   
? stepping stones leading to labour market integration, 
? maintain or enhance employment or employability through, for instance, 
combining part-time work with education or training, 
? or finally lead to poverty or social exclusion if non-standard jobs do not 
provide the necessary capabilities to make people independent. 
Thus, whether the flexibility-security nexus is a trade-off, a complementary or 
even a vicious relationship depends on the circumstances: especially on people’s 
position in the course of their life, but also on policies and on labour market regu-
lations shaping this nexus.  
The tlm-framework aims especially at critical events in people’s lives, in which 
work capacity or productivity is reduced due to unemployment, illness, old age, 
disability and social obligations such as care for children or other dependent per-
sons. The bridging function that is to be supported by tlm-measures such as pro-
vision of income security, training and counselling thereby differs depending on 
specific target groups.  
When it comes, for instance, to reduced productivity due to old age or disability, 
the provision of income security is advocated. Concerning workers whose work 
                                            
 3 The concept of transitional labour market was developed by a network of researchers 
in Europe sponsored by the fourth and fifth framework research programme of the 
European Commission under the acronyms TRANSLAM and TLM.NET. The theoreti-
cal background, illustrated by applications and good practices, is best represented in 
Schmid (2002) and Schmid and Gazier (2002). For further publications and current 
research, the reader is advised to visit the website: www.siswo.uva.nl/tlm. 
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capacity is temporarily reduced due to social responsibilities or illness, the ena-
bling of transitions back into the labour market or between full-time and part-time 
employment is called for. The German flexibility-security nexus faces the addi-
tional challenge not to serve as an incentive to reproduce the traditional role-
division between men and women. Furthermore, technical progress, international 
division of labour but also changing individual preferences might require a 
change of occupation or the acquisition of new qualifications. In this case, transi-
tions from unemployment to employment, between dependent employment and 
self-employment, and between high and low wage jobs are on the agenda. 
We have now a proper framework to assess some of the German Hartz-reforms 
in terms of efficient and equitable flexicurity criteria. First, we ask to what extent 
flexibility, especially internal and external numerical flexibility has been strength-
ened by the latest labour market reforms. To assess the security dimension, we 
ask whether the measures provide minimum income security to the atypically 
employed. As state-run labour market policies do not aim anymore at improving 
job security, we further concentrate on the question if the measures enable tran-
sitions into standard employment, as an expression of enhanced employability. 
Lastly, we try to assess if option security among the atypically employed is im-
proved. Thereby the particular needs of the schemes’ target groups are taken 
into account. Concerning unemployment, we adopt a broad definition which in-
cludes illegal employment and discouraged workers. 
3. How did Germany react to the ‘flexicurity’ challenge? 
Overall, it is fair to say that the flexibility-security nexus has not yet gained promi-
nence in Germany. The neologism of flexicurity is rarely used, and the main ac-
tors have a quite different stance on this issue. In its 2005 National Reform 
Programme, which is part of the European Employment Strategy, the government 
took up flexicurity in a rather lukewarm way. As in 2004, it points out that the na-
tional economy has to substantiate itself in a competitive environment through 
flexibility which has to be compatible with employees’ legitimate interest in secu-
rity. The need of a fair balance of both elements is emphasised. We are therefore 
going to ask whether the Hartz-reforms succeed in fairly balancing the two an-
tipodes. 
Concerning flexicurity, the trade unions still emphasise the importance of job se-
curity during economic downturns. In order to meet employers’ demands for flexi-
bility, trade unions clearly favour internal functional flexibility. A second strategy is 
to claim the optimal realisation of win-win-situations within the flexicurity-matrix. 
Among parts of the trade unions, the flexibility-security nexus is very popular. The 
trade union foundation (‘Hans-Böckler-Stiftung’), for example, focused on this 
issue by sponsoring research. By catering to various transitions in people’s life 
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span, the approach held by the trade union foundation is strongly related to the 
tlm-framework. However, the operative branches of the trade unions are faced 
with a certain dilemma: Although it is accepted that social insurance schemes 
have to reflect the ongoing social and economic changes, the standard employ-
ment biography as a normative guideline is not being questioned: Derived rights 
for non-working partners within health and pension insurance are usually not 
challenged but confirmed (compare for example DGB 2003). 
Among employers’ representatives, the flexicurity concept and corresponding 
policy proposals are not explicitly on the agenda. Instead, the need for further 
flexibility, for instance through retrenching employment protection without consid-
ering complementary security as in the Danish case, is strongly emphasised. In 
exchange for giving up employment protection, employees might get the option of 
severance payments. On the firm-level, strong emphasis is also given to flexible 
wages. In this respect, the flexibility-security nexus is mainly discussed as an 
exchange of wage restraints and job security through so called ‘Bündnisse für 
Arbeit’ (pacts for work). Pointing to the already high unemployment-rate, employ-
ers identify disincentives in social protection. Granting security to outsiders, par-
ticularly to the low skilled, is understood as a genuine public duty and envisaged 
as a (minimum) income security provided by the state encouraging them to ac-
cept flexible jobs. 
Recent German labour market reforms incorporate elements of flexicurity using 
different labels. The slogan ’Fördern and Fordern’ (actively supporting and de-
manding) has for example been coined with the ‘Job-AQTIV legislation’ enacted 
in the beginning of 2002, AQTIV standing for activation, qualification, training, 
investment and placement. The slogan captures flexicurity issues insofar as the 
unemployed are to be actively supported at an early stage by a range of labour 
market integration measures. On the other hand, unemployed are obliged to ac-
tively search for employment and to take up almost every job. The Job-AQTIV 
legislation thus introduced a clear paradigm change on both the security and the 
flexibility dimension: Employability security is now favoured over job security and 
functional flexibility within a firm has decreased for the benefit of external numeri-
cal flexibility. 
Later in that year (2002), the Hartz-commission chose a similar slogan: ‘Eigenak-
tivitäten auslösen – Sicherheiten einlösen’ (to help launch own initiatives but at 
the same time grant securities). This slogan, however, had a somewhat different 
connotation than ‘Fördern und Fordern’. Instead of granting benefits and services 
only if the beneficiaries in return behave in the expected way, the Hartz-slogan 
intended to offer a wider range of choices and a broader set of services. The be-
neficiaries’ own integration efforts should have been supported actively through 
services, for instance, child care facilities for working parents, comprehensive 
counselling services, including personnel services for small and medium sized 
enterprises, or incentives for employability measures both for employees and 
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employers. In the following sections, we are going to ask how far this strong pro-
active and preventative approach has been implemented in the selected reforms. 
4. What are the experiences with some specific  
‘flexicurity’ measures in Germany? 
The Hartz-reforms comprise a wide range of measures. Most important are the 
conversion of the federal employment office into a modern service provider, the 
improvement of job placement activities and the merging of unemployment assis-
tance and social assistance into a new basic benefit at the level of social assis-
tance (‘Arbeitslosengeld II’)4. Additionally, a range of new and modified policy 
instruments has been introduced. The most promising among them in terms of 
flexicurity are first (1), a new self-employment grant for formerly unemployed, the 
so-called Ich-AG, second (2), the introduction of personnel service agencies 
(PSA), third (3), the reform of the Mini- and the introduction of the Midi-Jobs, and 
fourth (4), the wage insurance for elderly workers. In the following paragraphs, 
we will present these measures and assess their potential for an efficient as well 
as equitable flexibility-security nexus. 
(1) The new self-employment grant (coined ‘Ich-AG’ by Hartz) supplements the 
already existing bridge money which capitalises unemployment benefit entitle-
ments in order to support the unemployed in setting up their own business. 
Whereas the individual amount of bridge money results from the unemployment 
benefits plus social insurance contributions and is paid for only six months, the 
Ich-AG allowance is paid as a yearly decreasing lump-sum for three years pro-
vided that the yearly income does not exceed € 25,000. The Ich-AG allowance 
therefore is especially suitable for those self-employed who do not expect high 
profits from their self-employment endeavour at the beginning and for those who 
only have low unemployment insurance entitlements.  
The take-up of the Ich-AG allowance has been much higher than expected, and it 
did not substitute the bridge money as originally feared. In terms of stock figures, 
in September 2005, 73,592 people were on bridge money, 236,412 on Ich-AG 
allowance, altogether about 0.8 percent of the active labour force (Bundesagen-
tur 2006). However, subsidised business-founders are rather close to the labour 
market (Martin 2000); thus windfall gains cannot be cancelled out. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that at the end of 2004 some founders only intended to improve 
their financial status with the Ich-AG allowance due to the introduction of Arbeits-
losengeld II (Bundesregierung 2006: 190). 
                                            
 4 ‘Arbeitslosengeld II’ comes effective when claims to unemployment insurance (‘Ar-
beitslosengeld I’) have expired. 
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How should this measure be judged with respect to the ideal flexibility-security 
nexus? Regarding flexibility, the possibility to hire a self-employed instead of a 
dependently employed has, among others, the advantage for the employer that 
dismissal protection does not apply to self-employed. In this regard, both types of 
external flexibility have been strengthened.5 Furthermore bureaucratic thresholds 
for founders have been lowered and recruitment of additional employment for 
founders has been facilitated through the option of fixed-term contracts for up to 
four years. Regarding branches, Ich-AGs are mainly taken up in services, con-
struction, trade, craft and IT (Bundesagentur 2006).  
Regarding the security-dimension, minimum income security is provided by a 
monthly allowance of € 600 in the first year, € 360 in the second, and € 240 in the 
third year. Concerning social security, it is important to note that in contrast to 
regular self-employment social insurance is obligatory as long as the Ich-AG-
founders receive the corresponding allowance. In this context the possibility to 
return to Arbeitslosengeld I or II and the facilitation to enter health and care in-
surance under favourable conditions weaken traditional disincentives to take the 
risk of self-employment.6 Although the Ich-AG allowance at first glance seems to 
provide the founder with minimum income security for three years, from the sec-
ond year on the allowance just suffices to cover the cost of social insurance con-
tributions. In fact, more than 20 percent in a sample of those who had already 
abandoned their Ich-AG stated as a reason that they had underestimated the 
cost of social insurance (Wießner 2005b: 397). In its recent plan to merge Ich-AG 
and bridge money (Bundesagentur: 2005), the Bundesagentur should consider 
those experiences. 
Since this measure focuses on unemployed, the question whether the Ich-AG-
founders will be able to sustain their businesses or at least don’t return to unem-
ployment is substantial for judging the effectiveness of this measure. So far, 
evaluation studies were faced with the problem that even the first Ich-AGs were 
still in the phase of assistance. This also applies to Wießner (2005a) according to 
whom 80 percent of the cumulated foundations were still active at the end of 
2004. Interviews revealed that for more than half of the people surveyed, bridge-
money and Ich-AG subsidised foundations have good or very good perspectives 
in the future (Wießner 2005b).  
Until December 2004, 48,000 break-ups (nearly 18 percent) had been counted. 
Wießner (2005a) examined a sample of those break-ups. As can be seen in fig-
ure 1 around 54 percent of those affected returned to unemployment (only 2 per-
cent without benefit receipt). 34 percent, on the other hand, abandoned their  
 
                                            
 5 However, the legislator aimed to prevent the exchange of employment subject to so-
cial insurance contributions through Ich-AGs and also adapted the criteria to define 
false self-employment. 
 6 At a reduced rate of 14 percent Ich-AG founders have to pay about € 140 health in-
surance and a contribution of about € 20 to care insurance. 
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Figure 1:  Continuance of the Ich-AG quitters 
unemployed with 
benefit receipt: 52 %
unemployed without 
benefit receipt: 2%
regularly 
employed: 34%
e.g. further training, 
parental leave, early 
retirement: 6%other self-
employment: 4%
atypically 
employed: 2%
 
n = 643 
Source: Wießner 2005a 
business and took up employment subject to social insurance contribution. If the 
sample results could be generalized, this would mean that 90 percent of the Ich-
AG-founders did not return to unemployment until the end of 2004. 
What are the reasons for Ich-AG failures? No business plan was required until 
2005. This clearly was a shortcoming. It would have helped to uncover the capac-
ity to realise the business idea and the financial viability of the project. In a sam-
ple based on the measure entrants in the third quarter of 2003, detailed 
consulting was only supplied to 10 percent (Wießner 2005b: X).7 Granting money 
without assisting the clients with their business idea by helping them to draft a 
business plan not only risks fast return to unemployment but can also drive cli-
ents into indebtedness. One third of the sample analysed by Wießner had accu-
mulated debt.  
It is interesting to note that the Ich-AG is increasingly carried out as part-time 
work. In this form, the Ich-AG is mostly taken up by women earning an additional 
household-income (Wießner 2005b: VII). In this regard they could use the work-
ing-time autonomy connected with Ich-AG subsidised self-employment to com-
bine paid work with social tasks or obligations, thereby increasing option security.  
To conclude, it must be acknowledged that the introduction of the Ich-AG clearly 
strengthens the German flexibility-security nexus. At the end of 2004, more than 
                                            
 7 One question asked to the sampled founders referred to consulting, thus about one 
third would have even abstained from parts of their allowance in exchange to a wider 
range of founding consulting offers (Wießner 2005b: 393). 
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80 percent of the newly founded businesses supported by the Ich-AG allowance 
were still active. Nevertheless, improvements of the scheme should be envis-
aged: more care has to be taken to support the sustainability of these new forms 
of self-employment through comprehensive counselling, training, coaching and – 
of special importance – networking during all stages of the business initiative. 
Though further evidence is needed, the introduction of the Ich-AG also seems to 
strengthen parents’ possibilities to combine paid with unpaid family work and thus 
cater to option security.  
(2) The personnel service agencies (PSA) institutionalise temporary employment 
as a regular labour market measure. The Hartz-legislation requires each labour 
office to place a contract with at least one temporary work agency (TWA) – pref-
erably an external service provider. In its function as PSA, the temporary work 
agency is required to place the unemployed who are assigned to them by the 
labour office. The idea is to privilege unemployed with barriers to employment 
who are usually not hired by conventional temporary work agencies (Jahn and 
Windsheimer 2004a). Until 2005, unemployed who were hired by a PSA got a 
temporary contract lasting from nine to twelve months; the employment-
relationship was subsidized by the labour office which paid a monthly declining, 
case-based fee. In 2005, the contracting practice was changed. The duration of 
the contracts was fixed at six months and the subsidy was modified by reducing 
the average payment from € 1,100 to € 500 and by paying constant instead of 
declining amounts. A negotiable premium if the unemployed is placed is still 
granted. In contrast to conventional temporary work agencies, PSAs carry out 
placement rather than rental functions. To prevent cut-throat competition, collec-
tive agreements concerning wage formation in the temporary work agency sector 
have been adopted. The PSA-measure was highly contested, mainly due to over 
optimistic expectations provoked by the Hartz-report and the bankruptcy of a 
large provider (MAATWERK).  
What is the general assessment of this measure? Regarding the flexibility-
dimension, the introduction of PSAs had important side effects: it led to the abol-
ishment of regulations of the temporary work market (for instance time limits of 
temporary work contracts) and thus helped to break the path for a more extended 
temporary work market. In this regard, PSAs can be judged as having enhanced 
external numerical flexibility and, to the extent that temporary work agencies can 
offer specialised and professionally skilled workers to firms, also external func-
tional flexibility. The latest developments show indeed a growing dynamic in this 
market. Additionally, the introduction of PSAs also contributed to collective 
agreements that allow lower starting wages for PSA-workers, this also puts 
wages of regular temp agencies under a certain pressure.  
With regard to the security dimension, the introduction of collective agreements 
for temporary work can be judged as having significantly contributed to enhance 
security for employees in this branch. Temporary work agencies are now commit-
ted to precise standards which led to an increasing acceptance of temporary 
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work. PSA-employees receive an employment contract and a wage with subse-
quent entitlements to social security benefits.  
To cope with the initial idea that PSAs, compared to regular TWAs, should be 
more open to unemployed with barriers to employment, employment offices are 
required to specify personal characteristics and occupational properties of target 
groups within a tender procedure. Set by a tender, the monthly paid fee was sup-
posed to differ depending on regional labour market conditions or individual bar-
riers to employment. We would thus expect that workers in TWAs and PSAs vary 
in their characteristics. 
Table 2:  Share of selected socio-economic groups in the TWAs and  
in the PSAs compared to the overall share in unemployment  
 
 
TWA-average 
in 2002 
PSA-average  
from April to  
October 2003 
Share of all  
unemployed  
in 2003 
Socio-economic group    
Women 27% 34% 44% 
Foreigners 14% 10% 13% 
Aged under 25 22% 33% 12% 
Aged 50 or older 12% 11% 24% 
Without vocational education  46% 30% 34% 
(Formerly) long-term  
unemployed   8% 14% 34% 
Health-related constraints Unknown 13% 28% 
 
Source: Bundesagentur (2003), Jahn and Windsheimer (2004b), own calculations.  
As can be seen in table 2, compared to temporary work agencies, more women 
(as intended) are employed by PSAs. Foreigners, on the other hand, are under-
represented. The high share of young workers in the PSAs results from a special 
stipulation which focusses on young workers (Jahn and Windsheimer 2004b). It 
demonstrates how certain target groups can be assisted in entering the labour 
market by specific contracting practices. Access for elderly workers who consti-
tute about a quarter of the unemployed is as restricted in PSAs as in TWAs. Con-
tra-intuitive is the fact that the share of workers without any vocational training is 
higher in TWAs than in PSAs. With 14 percent, the share of workers who formerly 
experienced long-term unemployment is higher in PSAs than in regular TWAs. All 
in all, the shares of disadvantaged groups in the PSAs are too small to allow the 
conclusion that the original intentions have been met. Because unemployed with 
low employment barriers are preferred, deadweight and substitution effects can-
not be ruled out. Although it is recognised that the effect of targeted premium 
incentives is limited by the existence of structural unemployment, the public em-
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ployment agency should concentrate on target groups and further enhance its 
efficiency by precise descriptions and improved contracting practices (a detailed 
analysis of the contracting-out is provided by Gülker and Kaps 2006). 
Transitions into regular employment are supposed to be enhanced by a two-
sided approach. On the one hand, PSAs are given financial incentives to place 
people into ‘secure’ jobs; a success bonus is paid when the unemployed is 
placed. On the other hand, the PSA is obliged to deliver training to workers in 
times when they are not on an assignment in order to improve their employability. 
Although some PSAs sporadically cooperated with educational institutions to de-
liver further training to their employees, training measures were mainly limited to 
‘coaching and assisted placement’. Structural reasons, for example the unknown 
and usually short duration of periods when the unemployed are not on an as-
signment hamper the organization of training measures. 
Data on outflows from PSA lessen the great expectations that had been con-
nected with this policy-measure. As can be seen in table 3, from the start of the 
PSA-measure in April 2003 until December 2005, all in all 128,975 unemployed 
(much less than expected) entered a PSA. Only 30 percent left the PSA to take 
up regular employment. However, integration-success differs between East and 
West Germany. A considerable problem, in this context, is the unfavourable eco-
nomic environment especially in East Germany. Without positive job dynamics, 
the bridging function of temporary work misses its target. The time of the PSA-
measure, therefore, might still come with the economic upswing. 
Concerning the destination of the majority of participants who leave the PSA 
without getting a regular employment contract, some presumptions can be drawn 
based on a study conducted by Jahn and Windsheimer (2004b). The authors 
 
Table 3:  Ongoing PSAs, cumulated inflows, stock, cumulated outflows and 
integration success in/until December 2005 
 
 
Ongoing 
PSAs 
Cumulated 
inflow Stock
Cumulated 
outflow 
Outflow  
into regular  
employment 
Average  
integration 
rate* 
Region       
Germany  
(total) 412 128,975 10,058 118,773 39,435 30% 
East  
Germany 104 42,917 3,054 39,791 10,300 24% 
West  
Germany 308 86,058 7,004 78,982 29,135 34% 
 
*  The average integration rate is the share of outflows into regular employment on cumulated 
inflows. 
Source:  Bundesagentur (2006). 
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analysed PSA-exits from April to October 2003. During that time-span, 9,005 out-
flows had been counted, nearly half of which entered regular employment. A ma-
jority of the remaining workers (nearly 40 percent of the outflow) had been 
dismissed by the PSA, mainly due to behaviour-based reasons (ibid.). At least in 
part this could be due to comparatively high flexibility requirements that tempo-
rary workers are faced with. 
To summarize, the success of PSAs was so far very limited and remained much 
behind the original expectations. Regarding flexibility, they led to the abolishment 
of temporary work market regulations and thereby strengthened external numeri-
cal flexibility. External functional flexibility has improved by the extent to which 
labour supply in temp agencies has broadened and diversified. Concerning un-
employed with barriers to employment, the expectations have not been fulfilled. 
Although some risk groups – especially youth and long-term unemployed – are 
better represented in PSAs than in regular TWAs, foreigners, elderly and the low 
qualified are underrepresented. In order to better serve disadvantaged groups of 
unemployed, the public employment agency has to concentrate on these groups 
in the tender procedure. However, the latest modifications in the tender proce-
dure point to a different dynamic in the future. Since the negotiable case-based 
subsidy was transformed into a constant amount, now only the placement-
premium can account for individual barriers to employment. But as is known from 
other countries (Australia and the Netherlands in particular), the proper design of 
targeted premium incentives and a contested market of effective private providers 
can both be created.  
(3) Marginal employment (Mini- and Midi-Jobs) was newly regulated through the 
Hartz-legislation. Different objectives were envisaged with these reforms: the 
containment of illegal work, especially in private households, the strengthening of 
employment subject to social insurance contribution, the creation of employment 
in the low wage sector and increasing incentives for unemployed to take up short-
time employment as stepping stones to regular jobs (BMWA 2003: 4, Bundes-
regierung 2003: 2-4). As part of the reform, the 15 hours limit has been abolished 
and marginal employment can once again be exercised in addition to regular em-
ployment without becoming subject to social insurance contribution. Concerning 
flexicurity the most relevant part of this reform is the introduction of the new Midi-
Jobs. They are to weaken financial disincentives to earn more than the maximum 
earnings of a Mini-Job by preventing the sudden onset of full social insurance 
contributions. Before the latest reforms, full social insurance contributions set in 
when passing the € 325 income limit. Now employees pay reduced contributions 
of 4 percent of their earnings when they earn at least € 401. Contributions then 
increase linearly until an income of € 800 when they reach the regular size of 21 
percent. Full social insurance rights are achieved. Employers pay full contribu-
tions that are at 20.85 percent somewhat lower than the contributions for Mini-
Jobs that usually amount to 25 percent (Rudolph 2003, Oschmiansky 2004). 
Theoretically, employers thus might be inclined to transform Mini-Jobs into Midi-
Jobs. 
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From 2003 to 2004, Mini-Jobs increased by 11 percent to 6.64 million. Midi-Jobs 
increased by a 100,000 (Bundesregierung 2006: 211) to about 720,000. One 
reason for the limited emergence of Midi-Jobs could be lacking knowledge about 
this measure. For example, at the end of December 2003 only 670,000 workers 
were registered as Midi-Jobbers although 1.1 million were employed at a gross 
pay between € 401 and € 800 (Bundesagentur 2004: 3, 11). Another reason can 
be seen in the German tax law. Due to a couple’s possibility to jointly tax its in-
come, incentives to enhance working hours within that wage range are low if the 
spouse draws a regular salary.8 Therefore the smoothing of the marginal em-
ployment trap only holds for persons whose income is between € 401 and € 800 
and who are taxed as unmarried (Steiner and Wrohlich 2004).  
The overall evaluation of marginal employment by employer representatives turns 
out positive. Especially Mini-Jobs are recognized as a cost-efficient and very 
flexible measure to deal with work peaks and extended opening hours. In this 
context, competitive branches such as trade, cleaning, gastronomy and tourism 
but also private households benefit most from this measure. Particularly small 
businesses appreciate the aspect of flexible and rapid use of marginal employ-
ment at relatively small costs (Fertig and Friedrich 2005: 129-130). Whereas 
those aspects already existed before 2003, by abolishing the weakly working 
hours limitation for Mini-Jobs the Hartz-reforms further strengthened internal nu-
merical flexibility.  
Concerning the security dimension, the maximum earnings for Mini-Jobs were 
raised from € 325 to € 400. Up to the maximum earnings only the employer pays 
social insurance contributions as part of a global contribution of 25 percent of 
earnings (12 percent retirement insurance, 11 percent health insurance and 2 
percent taxes). Employees acquire claims to retirement insurance proportional to 
their small wages9. It is possible to pay an optional pension insurance contribu-
tion (7.5 percent of earnings) that supplements employers’ contribution in order to 
gain full pension rights: entitlement to rehabilitation services, adherence of re-
tirement benefits in case of invalidity and accomplishing waiting periods. This 
option has only been taken up by 10 percent in a sample of marginal employed 
workers (Fertig et al. 2004: 56-65). 
Although possible earnings have been raised, marginal employment clearly does 
not provide sufficient independent income and social security. According to 
Bundesagentur (2004), about a quarter of the Mini-Jobs is occupied by young 
(under 20) and elderly (over 64) people who are usually covered by other sources 
of security. Another quarter is exercised as an additional second job (ibid.: 12). 
                                            
 8 For married couples with one earner above the social assistance threshold, the option 
for the remaining partner to supply working hours within the sliding scale of payments 
to social contributions remains unattractive compared to a Mini-Job.  
 9 In 1999, before the latest reform, one year of working in a Mini-Job gave right to 4.17 
DM (€ 2.12) retirement entitlement and 1.4 month were taken into account as waiting 
period (Neuhold 1999: 63). 
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By abolishing the regulation that Mini-Jobs – exercised in addition to regular em-
ployment – are subject to employees’ social insurance contributions, the reform 
strengthened incentives to use Mini-Jobs in that sense. This part of the reform is 
neither financially sustainable nor useful from a flexicurity-viewpoint because it 
gives advantages to those groups who already have income security. 
To judge the bridging function of this measure, one has to differentiate between 
transitions from illegal employment into formal employment and from unemploy-
ment into regular employment. In order to give incentives to transform illegal hou-
sehold work into formal employment, the private household pays a reduced 
contribution to social insurance of 12 percent and can set off ten percent of the 
Mini-Job’s costs against its tax liability (€ 510 at the maximum). The doubling of 
declared marginal employment in private households within one year to 60,000 
(Bundesagentur 2006) is an indicator for the success of this strategy. 
To support the policy-aim that Mini-Jobs function as a stepping stone for the un-
employed, the legislator made ‘Arbeitslosengeld II’ conditional on accepting any 
job including marginal employment. In a sample of 2,445 Mini-Jobbers analysed 
by Fertig et al. (2004), 15 percent had been unemployed before they took up 
marginal employment.10 The small share was seen as a result of income thresh-
olds for earnings additional to unemployment benefits. For beneficiaries of ‘Ar-
beitslosengeld II’, the legislator therefore raised thresholds in 2005.  
When it comes to the bridging function of Mini-Jobs doubts are appropriate. Table 
4 displays information on the reasons for taking up marginal employment and on 
the shares that made transitions to regular employment. It reveals that 15 percent 
of the sampled marginal workers took up a Mini-Job because they did not find 
another job. At the same time, only 9 percent of those who had left their Mini-Job 
on the date of interview performed regular employment instead. 
Midi-Jobs rather fulfil bridging expectations than Mini-Jobs but as has been 
pointed out they are considerably less important in number than Mini-Jobs. 32 
percent of those who had left their Midi-Job at the date of interview had made a 
transition to regular employment. More than one fourth of respondents exercised 
a Midi-Job because it was the only employment found. There is evidence that 
transition success of marginal employment significantly differs between East and 
West Germany. In this regard, the overall bad economic situation in East Ger-
many constitutes an additional barrier to realise transitions into regular employ-
ment. Furthermore, the question whether marginal employment substitutes em-
ployment subject to social insurance contributions – thereby reducing income 
security – is a vital issue in Germany. Although transitions from marginal em-
ployment to regular employment have increased, the general balance between  
 
                                            
 10 Among the unemployed who took up a Mini-Job the majority was long-term unem-
ployed before (Fertig et al. 2004: 67). 
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Table 4:  Selected figures on the bridging function of marginal employment 
Share of workers who… 
Type of marginal 
employment Region 
could not find  
other employment 
exercised regular em-
ployment afterwards* 
Mini-Job  
(n = 2,445) 
Germany  
(total) 15% 9% 
Midi-Job  
(n = 576) 
Germany  
(total) 28% 32% 
 East Germany 45% 27% 
  West Germany 20% 35% 
 
* Share on all workers who had left their Mini- or Midi-jobs at the date of interview. 
Source:  Bundesagentur (2004: 14); Fertig et al. (2004: 67, 81); Fertig and Friedrich  
(2005: 163-166). 
marginal employment and employment subject to social insurance contributions 
tends towards zero (Bundesagentur 2004: 14). It is questionable whether each 
regular job that had been converted into a Mini-Job would still exist otherwise. 
It can be taken for granted that marginal employment improves option security for 
many parents. Asked why they exercised marginal employment, a quarter of the 
Mini-Jobbers and a third of the Midi-Jobbers answered that they consciously de-
cided to do so in order to improve their work-life balance (Fertig et al. 2004: 81, 
Fertig and Friedrich 2005: 166). Given the great dependence on other security 
sources (such as derived rights to social insurance provided by the spouse); the 
effect of marginal employment on ‘gender-mainstreaming’ as an important issue 
in the European Employment Strategy, however, has to be considered critically. 
Table 5 shows that about three-quarter of all Mini-Jobbers and 84 percent of all 
Midi-Jobbers are women. Furthermore, the majority of Midi- and especially Mini-
Jobbers is married and about two third of all spouses of marginal workers are 
employed and in most cases probably provide derived social security rights to 
pension, health and care insurance. These simple figures already show how 
combination security enabled by marginal employment still depends on the so-
called male breadwinner model. The reform of Mini-Jobs enhanced both the ad-
vantages as well as the disadvantages of this employment form. For women who 
have to perform unpaid family work marginal employment often is the only possi-
ble form of employment, and for them potential earnings have somewhat in-
creased. The concentration of marginal employment in the service-sector on the 
other hand could turn into a barrier for women in this sector who would like to 
move on to regular full-time employment.  
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Table 5:  Share of selected socio-demographic characteristics of the  
Mini-and Midi-Jobbers 
 Woman Married Spouse  employed 
Receiving 
transfers 
Average  
age 
Mini-Job  
(n = 2,445) 73% 72% 66% 27% 47 years 
Midi-Job  
(n = 576) 84% 64% 67% 16% 42 years 
 
Source: Fertig et al. (2004: 51), Fertig and Friedrich (2005: 156). 
To draw a conclusion on marginal employment, Mini-Jobs and Midi-Jobs should 
be discussed separately. Although Mini-Jobs provide flexibility and are highly 
appreciated as side-jobs by many employees, the core idea of flexicurity is hardly 
promoted by this policy measure. Instead of enabling an (independent) minimum 
income security; the exercising of Mini-Jobs depends on the availability of other 
sources of security and income. Although the latest reform helped to convert ille-
gal private household employment into legal employment, transitions into regular 
employment of only 9 percent are too few to serve as a stepping stone for unem-
ployed into regular employment. Midi-Jobs, on the other hand, lead to higher 
shares of upward transitions but too less people are engaged in this employment 
relationship as to significantly enhance the flexicurity-nexus. While marginal em-
ployment today enables many mothers to combine paid and unpaid family work, it 
is at the cost of ‘gender-mainstreaming’ and more sustainable individual security 
entitlements. 
(4) The main idea of the wage insurance for elderly workers which was newly 
implemented as part of the Hartz-reforms is to temporarily compensate wage 
losses of elderly workers. Job changes might become necessary due to structural 
changes or the loss of individual productivity. Especially elderly workers face 
large income losses in case of unemployment and subsequent re-employment. 
Their risk of income loss is also nourished by the fact that internal labour markets 
which implicitly provided wage insurance through seniority wages are increas-
ingly disappearing. Furthermore, the escape into early retirement as an income 
insurance device is not any longer a viable option. Wage insurances have al-
ready been introduced in various forms in the United States, in France, and most 
comprehensively and successfully in Switzerland.  
Concerning the flexibility dimension, wage insurance is supplemented by setting 
incentives for employers to hire elderly workers. The employees’ benefit may be 
cumulated with wage cost subsidies for the employer; these subsidies already 
existed before the latest reform. Additionally, the Hartz-reforms included a regula-
tion specifying that workers older than 52 (before, the age-limit had been 58) 
could be employed on the basis of a fixed-term contract without time limit. The 
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German legislator is now planning to introduce other flexibility mechanisms, be-
cause the European court of justice in the end of 2005 declared that the regula-
tion violates community law.  
With regard to the security dimension, the German scheme is a supplement to 
the unemployment insurance system. It temporarily replaces 50 percent of the 
wage loss between the previous and the new job if an unemployed person who is 
older than 50 takes up a new lower paid job which is subject to social insurance 
contribution. The fact that contributions to pension insurance are increased so 
that 90 percent of the formerly paid contributions are reached is interesting from a 
flexicurity viewpoint.  
Although wage insurance for elderly workers constitutes an attractive combina-
tion of wage flexibility and income security, in 2004 only 6,433 elderly workers 
participated in this measure (Eichhorst and Sproß 2005). To some extent the 
German scheme is not well balanced with respect to flexibility and security. The 
wage compensation is only paid during the remaining time of unemployment 
benefit entitlement which has to be at least 180 days. Those unemployed who do 
not comply with this minimum requirement do not have access to the scheme in 
the first place.  
To draw a conclusion, the wage insurance-measure strengthens external numeri-
cal flexibility while at the same time granting some income security to elderly 
workers. Participation in the measure is restricted to workers who at the time of a 
new job offer still have at least 180 days entitlement to unemployment insurance 
benefits. And as most unemployed elderly workers – especially in East Germany 
– are long-term unemployed, the wage insurance incentive had a very limited 
impact. If the results do not improve, the scheme is going to be discontinued in 
the current year.  
5. What lessons can be learned from the German  
experiences for the European Employment Strategy? 
First, there is no definition of flexicurity which is shared by social partners. Trade 
unions perceive security as a precondition for flexibility and emphasise functional 
flexibility within stable employment. The employers, on the other hand, tend to 
consider flexibility – especially wage flexibility – as the solution for employment 
security and stress disincentive effects deriving from employment protection and 
unemployment benefit receipt. These varying perceptions of flexicurity reflect the 
structural tension of different interests that have to be taken into account when 
measures aimed at the reconciliation of flexibility and security are designed and 
implemented. 
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But the debate on a proper flexibility-security nexus is just beginning. There is 
some chance that it could be the vehicle to revitalise the social dialogue and 
promote the negotiation of new topics between the social partners, both at na-
tional and European level. Especially the improvement of employment security by 
establishing branch specific collective training funds or facilitating complementary 
relations between flexibility and security in the course of people’s lives seem to 
be issues for negotiations where all sides could win in the long run. The further 
stimulation and coordination of this debate at the European level could be a 
promising task for the Directorate General ‘Employment and Social Affairs’. Es-
pecially the creation of adequate indicators, the careful screening and the effec-
tive diffusion of good practices are worthwhile objectives.  
Concerning the recent German experiences, it must first be acknowledged that 
the German labour market reforms responded to the debate on flexicurity with 
some innovative measures. In terms of flexibility, the presented measures clearly 
strengthen numerical flexibility which, compared to the EU-15 average, had in-
deed been underdeveloped. The possibility to return to compulsory social insur-
ance facilitates the decision to found an enterprise. Increased thresholds for 
additional income for long-term unemployed, the smoothing of social insurance 
contributions within the Midi-Job-scheme and the conversion of claims to unem-
ployment insurance into a wage grant within the wage insurance-scheme for eld-
erly workers clearly alleviate disincentives in the German security system 
typically criticised by employer representatives.  
But in terms of security, the presented measures only cover the (new) social risks 
to some degree and do not go far enough. The strong pro-active and preventa-
tive implications of the slogan ‘Eigenaktivitäten auslösen – Sicherheiten einlösen’ 
(to help launch own initiatives but at the same time grant securities) were only 
partly taken up. Whereas the original approach included services, for instance 
childcare facilities for working parents or comprehensive counselling services, the 
PSA is the only measure which includes a link to the employability concept. Also 
new social rights such as the right to substantive training leaves, the right to sab-
baticals, to income insurance at temporary working time reduction or to consult-
ing are still missing in the German flexicurity-nexus.  
The analysis of the four measures revealed that the balance of the flexibility-
security nexus in Germany could be improved by strengthening the security di-
mension within the individual measures. Although the experiences with the Ich-
AG are encouraging, especially when it comes to the question of sustainability of 
new businesses a more encompassing strategy that provides consulting, training 
and networking is of utmost importance. In general, self-employment initiatives 
are only useful for a small group of unemployed who are rather close to the mar-
ket.  
PSAs still fail to concentrate on their original target group – unemployed with bar-
riers to employment. The contracting-practice has to be improved to cope with 
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this, otherwise there is little justification to subsidise the work of PSAs because 
they could as well be substituted by regular TWAs. 
With regard to Mini-Jobs, employers have meanwhile been demanding the re-
amendment of this measure. They want to handle the monthly wage-limit of € 400 
in a more flexible way (Fertig and Friedrich 2005: 131). Often criticised are the 
facts that marginal employment due to income-thresholds is unattractive for re-
cipients of unemployment benefits and attracts people who primarily receive se-
curity from other sources – especially housewives. Midi-Jobs which grant 
individual insurance were to function as stepping stones into regular employment 
for persons who were formerly trapped in marginal employment. In fact, the 
measure has not been very successful, probably due to the possibility to jointly 
assess a couple’s income so that in effect the marginal employment trap has only 
been smoothed for singles. German evaluation studies on the effects of subsidis-
ing social insurance contributions of people with low earnings and their employ-
ers have so far not been favourable (Sinn et al. 2002: 13-16). The qualification 
fund that was part of such a pilot project, namely the ‘Saar-Gemeinschafts-
Initiative’, is worth mentioning. A qualification strategy that could promote upward 
transitions is completely lacking in the Mini- and Midi-Job concepts.  
Although wage insurance in Germany has not been successful due to both its 
restrictive design and lack of information among potential users, in principle, it 
could become a paradigm example for a functioning flexibility-security nexus in 
the European Employment Strategy. The Swiss scheme, in this regard, has 
proven more successful than the German one. According to rigorous evaluations, 
it is more successful for the following reasons: First, all workers entitled to unem-
ployment benefits are also entitled to wage insurance independent of their age, 
second, the replacement rates of the Swiss ‘Zwischenverdienst’ are quite gener-
ous, especially for elderly workers with dependent family members, and third, the 
requirement to accept jobs with lower income is strictly administered (Lechner et 
al. 2004). 
To finish as we began with Schumpeter’s paradox: If we want a high speed la-
bour market, we have to develop – in analogy to broader traffic routes, more reli-
able bridges, stronger brakes but also speed limits and speed control for fast 
travelling motorcars – improved labour market services, transitional labour mar-
kets bridging critical events in the course of people’s lives, stronger income and 
employability securities and, last but not least, strictly controlled minimum stan-
dards.  
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